

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 113201
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:MCLISSFELT/RCEWING:LB
APPROVED BY C:MNIMETZ
EUR:GSVEST
S/S-O:RCASTRODALE

-----012651 040040Z /62

O P 032349Z MAY 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 113201

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, TU

SUBJECT:NIMETZ-ESENBEL MEETING MAY 3

1. AT REQUEST OF SECRETARY, COUNSELOR NIMETZ CALLED IN
TURKISH AMBASSADOR ESENBEL MORNING MAY 3 TO DISCUSS CURRENT
SITUATION REGARDING CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD ADMINIS-
TRATION'S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSAL. ASSTSEC VEST WAS
ALSO PRESENT. MEETING TOOK PLACE BEFORE HIRC MARK-UP AND
VOTE ON GREECE-TURKEY-CYPRUS PORTION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
BILL (SEPTTEL).

2. NIMETZ EMPHASIZED AT OUTSET THAT THE SECRETARY, AFTER
A NUMBER OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS CONGRESS-
MEN, WAS DEEPLY WORRIED ABOUT ULTIMATE PROSPECTS IN CONGRESS

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FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS ON LIFTING THE EMBARGO.
THE SECRETARY WANTED ESENBEL TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF
OUR ASSESSMENT THAT PROPOSAL WAS IN REAL TROUBLE. THE SE-
CRETARY ALSO WANTED ESENBEL TO CONVEY TO ANKARA HIS BELIEF
THAT SUCCESS COULD HINGE ON TURKISH SIDE FINDING SOME WAY TO
SHOW A MORE FORTHCOMING AND FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE CONCERNING
ITS CYPRUS PROPOSALS. WE WERE NOT ASKING THE TURKISH SIDE

TO CHANGE THESE PROPOSALS. WE WERE URGING INSTEAD THAT THE TURKISH SIDE CLARIFY AND DESCRIBE THEM IN A MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING WAY. NIMETZ EMPHASIZED THAT THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE SINCE THE PROPOSALS HAVE NEVER BEEN REVEALED PUBLICLY.

THIS RELATED PARTICULARLY TO BOTH THE TERRITORIAL PROPOSAL AND THAT ON VAROSHA. NIMETZ RECALLED THAT AMBASSADOR SPIERS HAD MADE A SIMILAR REQUEST TO OKCUN LAST WEEKEND. NIMETZ ACKNOWLEDGED, IN RESPONSE TO ESENBEL QUERY, THAT OKCUN'S REACTION HAD NOT BEEN VERY POSITIVE. NIMETZ INDICATED THAT ANOTHER POINT WHERE FURTHER TURKISH ASSURANCES WOULD BE HELPFUL RELATED TO THE FUTURE USE OF US-SUPPLIED WEAPONS ONCE THE EMBARGO WAS LIFTED. CONGRESS IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ON THIS POINT. NIMETZ RECOGNIZED THAT THE GOT HAD ALREADY MADE STATEMENTS ON THIS POINT, BUT NOW WOULD BE A MOST HELPFUL TIME FOR FURTHER AND MORE EXPLICIT ASSURANCES TO BE GIVEN.

3. WITH REGARD LATTER POINT, ESENBEL ASKED NIMETZ IF HE COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC REGARDING WHAT THE USG WOULD FIND HELPFUL. NIMETZ SUGGESTED ONE HELPFUL ACTION WOULD BE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT, ONCE EMBARGO WAS ENDED, US ARMS WOULD BE USED BY GOT ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE AND NATO PURPOSES. WITH REGARD CYPRUS, NIMETZ SUGGESTED IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE STATEMENT FROM TURKEY REAFFIRMING THAT TURKISH FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM CYPRUS AS PART OF
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SETTLEMENT.

4. ESENBEL OBSERVED THAT GOT WOULD STILL MOST PROBABLY ASK WHAT SPECIFICALLY IT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO. HE RECALLED THAT USG HAD SAID THERE WAS NO LINKAGE BETWEEN ATTEMPTS TO LIFT EMBARGO AND TURKISH PROPOSALS RELATING TO CYPRUS. DEPARTMENT ONCE AGAIN SEEMED TO BE REINTRODUCING LINKAGE. NIMETZ SAID THAT DEPARTMENT STARTED FROM PREMISE THAT THERE IS NO LINKAGE. DEPSEC CHRISTOPHER'S STATEMENT TO SFRC MAY 2 AS WELL AS THAT BY CLIFFORD REFLECTED THIS PREMISE. HOWEVER, MANY IN CONGRESS IMMEDIATELY ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT CYPRUS CLEARLY INDICATING THAT SUCH LINKAGE STILL CARRIES HEAVY WEIGHT IN THEIR ANALYSIS.

5. NIMETZ NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NO SPECIFIC REQUEST TO MAKE. HE REITERATED THAT IN OUR VIEW TURKISH SIDE SHOULD SOMEHOW CLARIFY TO MUCH GREATER EXTENT ITS PROPOSALS ON CYPRUS, PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORY AND VAROSHA. NIMETZ STATED THAT SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES HAD BEEN PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR SPIERS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ADDED THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION TO TELL TURKISH SIDE HOW TO NEGOTIATE BUT WE DID FEEL IT MIGHT HELP PRESENT SITUATION IF MORE DE-

TAILS CONCERNING THE TURKISH PROPOSALS COULD BE GIVEN TO WALDHEIM OR ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY. NIMETZ EMPHASIZED THAT TURKS SHOULD RETHINK PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS OF PROPOSALS. WE FEARED TURKEY WAS LOSING GREAT OPPORTUNITY; OUR CHANCES ON CAPITOL HILL HAD NOW FALLEN TO LESS THAN 50-50. NIMETZ

SAID THIS WAS HIS PRIVATE ASSESSMENT BUT HE FELT SECRETARY SHARED IT.

6. ESENBEL SAID TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD NOT CHANGE PROPOSALS UNTIL TALKS RESUMED. NIMETZ SAID USG UNDERSTOOD THIS. VEST EMPHASIZED THAT ADMINISTRATION IS MAKING GREAT EFFORT ON THIS ISSUE. BASED ON HIS OWN CONTACTS, VEST SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE WAS GREATER THAN ANTICIPATED. THIS WAS NOT SECRET

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LIMITED SIMPLY TO THE SO-CALLED "GREEK LOBBY." THIS IS A PRACTICAL FACT OF LIFE WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL.

7. ESENBEL OBSERVED THAT IN HIS VIEW, EFFORT COULD BE WON ON BASIS OF US NATIONAL INTEREST. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS A PERSONAL EFFORT BY PRESIDENT CARTER HIMSELF. NIMETZ STRESSED TO ESENBEL THAT PRESIDENT WAS INDEED PERSONALLY INVOLVED ON THIS ISSUE AND THAT EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAM WAS CURRENTLY AMONG THE TWO OR THREE HIGHEST PRIORITY LEGISLATION ITEMS IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

8. AMBASSADOR SHOULD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AT HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL, PREFERABLY TO ECEVIT, REPEAT IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS DEMARCHE MADE BY NIMETZ TO ESENBEL. YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT NARROWEST POSSIBLE VICTORY BY ONE VOTE IN POSITIVELY DISPOSED HIRC MAY 3 HAS MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH THAT IF PROGRAM IS TO PASS SOME VERY CLEAR TURKISH ACTION ON CYPRUS IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL BEFORE LEGISLATION IS TAKEN UP BY FULL HOUSE AND SENATE. (FYI: THIS MAY NOT OCCUR UNTIL SOMETIME IN JUNE WHICH GIVES US SOME TIME TO WORK.) ONE USEFUL STEP WOULD BE IF TURKISH SIDE WERE TO CONVINCE WALDHEIM THAT BASIS DOES EXIST TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE DRAMATIC WITHDRAWAL OF SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF TURKISH TROOPS FROM CYPRUS. AS NIMETZ POINTED OUT OUR INTENTION IS NOT TO SUGGEST WHAT SHOULD BE DONE, BUT TO TRY TO EXPLAIN TO TURKS IN CLEAREST POSSIBLE TERMS WHY SOMETHING IS ESSENTIAL AT EARLY DATE. YOU SHOULD STRESS STRONGLY THAT PRESIDENT AND SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE WERE PERSONALLY INVOLVED WITH A NUMBER OF HIRC MEMBERS IN SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO SECURE FAVORABLE COMMITTEE ACTION. STRONGEST POSSIBLE ADMINISTRATION EFFORT WILL CONTINUE AND WILL BE INTENSIFIED; HOWEVER HELP IS URGENTLY NEEDED IN A SECRET

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DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:RCEWING

APPROVED BY EUR:MPARRIS

S/S-O:DROBINSON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0000

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S E C R E T STATE 113201

EXDIS, MILITARY ADDEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOL RPT STATE 113201 ACTION ANKARA INFO NICOSIA ATHENS
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UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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NNN

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Draft Date: 03 may 1978
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TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, TU, ZM, (ESENBEL, MELIH), (NIMETZ, MATTHEW)
To: ANKARA
Type: TE
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